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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUDE J. NICHOLES, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
JAMES LEWIS NICHOLES, 
Defendant/Respondent, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CASE NO: 880273-CA 
CATEGORY NO: 14 b 
Appeal from a Judgment of the 
Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, Presiding 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. and Mrs. Nicholes were married on June 30, 1964, 
and separated November 21, 1986. Mrs. Nicholes was 16 years 
old at the time and Mr. Nicholes was 18. (See*trial record 
at pages 29, 143, and deposition of Dr. Gordon at page 28) 
Three children were born of the marriage (See trial record 
at page 28) , one child was already emancipated due to age 
with two remaining minor children, Rebecca, born April 30, 
I 
1974, and Jason Emanuel, born December 15, 1969 (see trial 
record page 3) both minor children were eventually awarded 
to the Plaintiff subject to Defendant's reasonable visita-
tion as is convenient and appropriate between the minor 
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children and the Defendant, Mr. Nicholes. (See trial record 
page 166). 
Mrs. Nicholes has worked primarily as a housewife, 
raising the three children, although she has had training as 
a seamstress but is unable to work because of her present 
medical problems (see trial record at pages 81 through 84). 
Medical testimony does indicate that Mrs. Nicholes is 
capable of doing some work in her home as long as it is for 
short periods of time (see trial record at page 23) . The 
Trial Court at Defendant's objection to the original 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce stated in reference to the Plaintiff !s present 
physical condition as follows: 
The court feels, as well, that some of 
the ailments that your wife had were as 
a result of her own mental structure. 
(See trial record at page 215) . 
Mr. Nicholes, the Respondent, has worked two jobs 
during most of the marriage and was laid off from his 
daytime job at Western States Masonry and his night time job 
at Kennecott for a period in 1985 and 1986. (See trial 
record pages 171, 182 through 184). Mr. Nicholes became 
re-employed at Kennecott sometime after December of 1986 on 
the day shift rather than the evening shift. Due to lack of 
employment in the masonry business and certain physical and 
medical conditions Mr. Nicholes was unable to return to work 
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at Western States Masonry (see trial record page 167, 182, 
and the deposition of Dennis H. Gordon, M.D. page 10, 14, 
16, 17, 19, 22, 23, 27, 28) Due to Mr. Nicholes1 inability 
to work two jobs based on the present work circumstances and 
his present physical condition there was a loss of yearly 
income from $43,600.00 in 1985 to $22,655.00 in 1986, while 
the parties were still married, the separation not taking 
place until the 21st of November, 1986. (See trial record 
at page 37). 
The appeal is from a divorce granted to the parties on 
August 7, 1987, with the actual Decree of Divorce to be 
final within 90 days after entry. On March 7, 1988, Defen-
dant, by and through his counsel, objected to the Plain-
tiff's original proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and the Decree of Divorce. At that time the Court 
modified its previous Order and ordered that the Decree 
would become final 60 days after entry, which entry was the 
22nd day of March, 1988. (See trial record pages 166 and 
171). The actual date of the divorce should have been May 
20, 1988, and the Notice of Appeal was filed April 21, 
1988. (See trial record page 188). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial Court findings should not be disturbed 
or reversed in a divorce case in equity unless this Court 
finds that there has been a clear abuse of discretion 
exercised by the Trial Court. 
2. The Trial Court properly applied the three factors 
to be considered in awarding alimony in arriving at its 
final award to the Appellant and did not abuse its dis-
cretion in making that award. 
3. The Trial Court properly applied the seven factors 
to be considered in awarding child support in arriving at 
its final award to the Appellant and did not abuse its 
discretion in making that award. 
4. The Trial Court properly applied this Court's 
standards in regards to awarding State and Federal income 
tax exemptions in ordering the Appellant to sign waivers for 
the Respondent to claim those exemptions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLATE COURT WILL NOT DISTURB THE 
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT UNLESS THERE 
IS A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN A 
DIVORCE CASE. 
The Appellate Court in reviewing matters in equity and 
more specifically, in a divorce action, will refrain from 
disturbing the Findings of the Trial Court unless a clear 
abuse of discretion by the Trial Court is shown. 
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The standard for reviewing matters in equity was 
recently considered by the Utah Supreme Court in J & M 
Construction, Inc., v. Southam, 722 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986), 
wherein the Court held as follows: 
In reviewing matters in equity, this 
Court will reverse the Trial Court only 
when the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings below. Although we 
may review that evidence, we are partic-
ularly mindful of the advantage position 
of the Trial Court to hear, weigh, and 
evaluate the testimony of the parties, 
(cites omitted) Where the evidence may 
be in conflict, this Court will not 
upset the findings below unless the 
evidence so clearly preponderates 
against them that this Court is con-
vinced that a manifest injustice has 
been done.... 
This court in the recent decision of Boyle v. Boyle, 735 
P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987) held as follows: 
This Court will refrain from disturbing 
findings of the Trial Court in a divorce 
action unless a clear abuse of dis-
cretion is shown, (cite omitted) The 
Trial Court is clearly in the best 
position to weigh the evidence, deter-
mine credibility and arrive at factual 
conclusions. 
Accordingly, pursuant to case law, unless this court 
finds a clear abuse of discretion in this equity or divorce 
matter, it should not disturb the findings of the Trial 
Court which stands in a better position to weigh the evi-
dence, determine credibility and arrive at factual con-
clusions . 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ITS DETERMINATION OF THE 
ALIMONY AWARD. 
The Appellant cites this Court to a decision of the 
Utah Supreme Court of Jones v. Jones, 700 P. 2d 1072 (Utah 
1985) which cites the earlier Utah Supreme Court case of 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977) wherein it was 
held that the Trial Court must consider the following 
factors in awarding alimony: (1) The financial conditions 
and needs of the spouse claiming support, (2) The ability of 
that spouse to provide sufficient income for himself or 
herself, and (3) The ability of the responding spouse to 
provide the support. The failure of the Trial Court to 
analyze the parties1 circumstances using these three factors 
does constitute an abuse of discretion. Paffel v. Paffel, 
732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986) 
The underlying purpose of alimony is to "enable the 
receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to 
prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge. In an 
action for divorce, the Trial Court has considerable dis-
cretion to provide for spousal support, and this Court will 
- f i -
not interfere with the trial court's award of such support 
in a divorce proceeding absent the showing of a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion." Paffel v. Paffel, supra. 
The Appellant cites this Honorable Court to the Utah 
Supreme Court Case of Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 
1985) wherein that court held "an alimony award should come 
as far as possible, to equalize the parties1 respective 
standards of living and maintain them in a level as close as 
possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage." But the court in that opinion went on further to 
state as follows: 
While the alimony award was far below the 
total amount required to maintain the wife at 
the standard of living she enjoyed during the 
marriage, it is reasonable in light of the 
limited family resources available to fulfill 
her needs. Thus, we find no abuse of dis-
cretion. Should the relevant circumstances 
change in the future, the wife may petition 
the court for modification of the amount of 
alimony under the court's continuing juris-
diction. I_d, 567. 
In the immediate case at hand, "turning to the record 
in the absence of sufficient findings" Icl, 567, the trial 
record would indicate beginning at page 189 through page 192 
where the Trial Court is rendering its decision: 
The problem is that there is just 
not enough to go around, and you both 
come out unhappy. The court had the 
benefit of financial data from both of 
you, both at the temporary level.... 
Kennecott, everyone in the world 
knows Kennecottfs circumstances. And I 
hear about it more than most of you 
because most of our bailiff's are 
ex-Kennecott employees, and the 
Kennecott people that were fortunate to 
find work again go back at lower rates, 
they are not doing as well as they did 
formerly, and I don't know the circum-
stances and heard no evidence about the 
current circumstances about Western 
Masonry, though itfs apparent that the 
construction industry is not robust by 
any measure certainly. 
And so, the court really doesn't 
have the perception that Mr. Nicholes is 
sandbagging at this point, and I'm stuck 
with what he has got, and I'll certainly 
require that he produce periodic infor-
mation about his finances, and I cer-
tainly would adjust to more appropriate 
levels if it's there. 
He shouldn't be penalized for the 
fact that he's been a hard worker most 
of his life. He finds, like most of us 
do, that he's worn out a little bit and 
not as marketable as he used to be. 
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion, but did 
in fact analyze the parties' circumstances in the Nicholes 
case in light of the English and Jones factors. Firstly, in 
regards to the "financial conditions and needs of the spouse 
claiming support", or in this case the Appellant, evidence 
was presented and considered by the court regarding the 
Appellant's financial conditions and needs as indicated by 
exhibits demonstrating the Appellant's needs including the 
needs of the minor children living with her ranging between 
$1,984.75 to $2,134.78 per month. The exhibits were not 
objected to but were subjected to cross-examination by 
Defendant/Respondent in regards to those expenses and are 
part of the record although not in the Findings (see Exhibit 
5 and trial record at pages 66 through 67 and pages 108 
through 111). 
The Utah Supreme Court in a case cited by the Appel-
lant, Paffel v. Paffel, supra in regards to the Appellant's 
appeal from a permanent award of alimony to his wife argued 
that the Trial Court had failed to make findings concerning 
his wifefs income, expenses or need for support and that 
this constituted error held as follows: 
The supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, as well as the 
Memorandum Decision of the Trial Court, 
did not specifically set forth the facts 
showing Respondent's needs or ability to 
provide support for herself. Instead 
they focused primarily upon the Appel-
lant's ability to pay support. In 
Walker v. Walker, [707 P.2d 110] (Utah 
1985) [Restated]: 
The Trial Court did not enter 
any Findings of Fact or 
Conclusions of Law demonstrat-
ing the consideration of these 
factors or the weight assigned 
to each. Such an analysis by 
the Trial Court would assist 
this Court in determining the 
propriety of the ruling. 
However, our examination of 
the record suggests no basis 
for concluding either that the 
Trial Court did not consider 
these factors or that • it 
abused its discretion. 
As in Walker, the evidence in this case 
supports the lower court's order, and 
Appellant has made no showing to rebut 
the presumption that the Trial Court did 
not consider Respondent's income, 
expenses, and need for support. 
Olson and Paf fel have cited, and in light of the 
evidence on record and the opinion of the Court on the trial 
record from pages 189 through pages 192 adequately show that 
the evidence in the Nicholes case supports the lower court's 
order and that the Appellant has made no showing to rebutt 
the presumption that the Trial Court had not considered the 
Appellant's financial conditions and needs as required in 
the first standard of the three standards enumerated in 
English, supra. 
This Court held in Eames v. Eames, 735 P. 2d 395 (Utah 
App. 1987) , that the Trial Court had carefully and properly 
considered the three above factors and found that there was 
no abuse of discretion such that the award of alimony would 
not disturb. That case specifically dealt with a couple not 
unlike the parties in the immediate case with a similar 
number of years of marriage. In Eames the parties had had 
three children born into their marriage* and at the time of 
their trial the youngest child was 18 years of age and 
resided with the wife in the family home, such as Rebecca 
was residing with the Appellant in the family home. In the 
Eames case the Plaintiff, who was the Respondent and the 
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wife, was awarded alimony in the amount of $450.00 per month 
as long as the youngest child successfully pursued a 
full-time college education, lived in the home, remained 
single or reached the age of 21 years at which time the 
alimony would be reduced to $300.00 per month and would 
remain so until the Plaintiff reached the age of 65 years at 
which time the alimony would terminate. 
The Trial Court in Eames further found that the Plain-
tiff was employed as a department store manager and- clerk 
for a large store and had a gross income of approximately 
$10,000.00 per year, and that she had been employed during 
most of the marriage in unskilled or untrained type po-
sitions, while the Appellant/Defendant was a manufacturing 
engineer with a gross income of approximately $34,000.00 per 
year, which represents a difference in income of approxi-
mately $24,000.00 a year. 
In the immediate case at hand, the Plaintiff, Mrs. 
Nicholes, has no income, the trial Judge did find the 
present income of the Defendant to be $1,665.00 a month or 
close to $20,000.00 a year (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, page 2) , and did award to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$250.00 per month, not until age 65, not to decrease or be 
reduced when the minor child left the home, but a lifetime 
support of $250.00 a month, with the opportunity to review 
the Defendant's income on a continuing basis and increase 
that alimony amount should the Defendant's income increase. 
(See trial record at page 192, lines 4 through 7). 
In regards to the second factor, "the ability of the 
wife to produce sufficient income for herself" the court did 
make a specific finding "that the Plaintiff is unemployed, 
and has physical problems that prevent her from employment" 
(see Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 2). 
There is no abuse of discretion here in that the Trial Court 
clearly found that the spouse claiming support did not have 
the ability to provide sufficient income for herself even in 
light of the testimony that she had training as a seamstress 
(see trial record at pages 81 through 84), medical testimony 
that she was capable of doing some work in her home as long 
as it was for short periods of time (see trial record at 
page 23), and the Court's finding that some of. the ailments 
•chat the Plaintiff had were as a result of her own mental 
structure (see trial record at page 215). 
In regards to the third factor, "the ability of the 
husband to produce support" the court specifically found 
that "the Defendant is currently empLoyed at Kennecott and 
earning, approximately, $1,665.00 gross, per month." (see 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 2) . The 
Appellant refers this Court and attaches as an Exhibit to 
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its Addendum, a copy of proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law submitted by counsel for Mrs. Nicholes 
which included the recitation of Mr. Nicholes historical 
earnings for the years 1982 through 1986 which earnings were 
admittedly much greater than his earnings at the time the 
Decree of Divorce was entered. 
Defendant by and through his counsel objected to 
Plaintiff's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Decree of Divorce requesting the Trial Court to remove 
any reference to the parties1 gross earnings from 1982 to 
1985 as the Trial Court did not specifically find that these 
were the parties' gross wages. The court at the objection 
hearing on March 7, 1988, held or stated as follows: 
The motion with respect to the 
earnings, I will strike the phrase as to 
past earnings. I clearly intended to 
make my findings on income based upon 
current circumstances; that is, that 
he's working for Kennecott Copper at a 
reduced salary from over and above what 
he formerly earned, and that was simply 
a condition of employment at Kennecott 
over which he had no control, and he has 
no means of going back and getting the 
former salary restored he got at 
Kennecott. 
With respect to the masonry income, 
the economy appears to the court in 
terms of the construction business to be 
flat, which may be an understatement. 
And so for that reason, the court 
doesn't feel that there was any bad 
faith on his part in terms of scheming 
to drop that employment. 
The court further stated at the* objection hearing in 
regards to Mr. Nicholes1 employment and payment of alimony 
as follows: 
The court only ordered $100.00 per 
month per child, Mr. Nicholes. And 
although $450.00 from $1,600.00 gross 
earnings or thereabouts is a significant 
bite out of your hide, it Wcis a marriage 
of long duration, and the court just 
simply chose to give her a higher 
alimony award than give it to the kids 
because of her ability to have that 
award over an indefinite period of time. 
(See trial record at pages 214 to 215). 
The court further stated in regards to Mr. Nicholes 
present income and employment situation in the court's 
concluding statements at the trial of October 6 and 7, 1987, 
as follows: 
Kennecott, everyone in the world knows 
Kennecott's circumstances. And I hear 
about it more than most of you because 
most of our baiiffs are ex Kennecott 
employees, and the Kennecott people that 
were fortunate to find work again go 
back at lower rates, and they are not 
doing as well as they did formerly, and 
I don't know the circumstances and heard 
no evidence about the current circum-
stances about Western Masonry, though 
it's apparent that the construction 
industry is not what robust by any 
measure currently. So, the court really 
doesn't have the perception that Mr. 
Nicholes is sandbagging at this point, 
and I'm stuck with what he has got and 
I'll certainly require that he produce 
periodic information about his finances, 
and I certainly would adjust to more 
appropriate levels if it's there. 
_i A -
He shouldn't be penalized for the 
fact that hef s been a hard worker most 
of his life. He finds, like most of us 
do, that he's worn out a little bit and 
not as marketable as he used to be. 
Accordingly, the Trial Court properly relied on Mr. 
Nicholes1 income at the time of the Divorce Decree 
especially under the circumstances that the parties had 
lived together for almost one year under the reduced income 
before the parties had even separated. 
The Appellant refers this Court to its decision of 
Canning v. Canning, 744 P.2d 325 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
wherein this Court reversed the amended judgment on the 
issue of alimony and remanded for additional findings and 
possible modification. In the Canning case the Trial Court 
found only that the Defendant or Mrs. Canning was unemployed 
at the time of the trial and that the Defendant should be 
awarded no alimony under the three factors previously 
described in Jones and English v. English, 565 P. 2d 409 
(Utah 1987) . This Court found that "although this Court has 
the power to modify the Decree accordingly, a lack of 
necessary findings in the record prevents us from doing so11 
in regards to modifying the alimony. 
As the Appellant has indicated in her brief, in Canning 
the wife's needs and her ability to earn were inadequately 
developed whereas in the immediate case at hand the trial 
Judge did specifically find as indicated above that the 
Plaintiff was unemployed and had physical problems that 
prevented her employment and the Trial Court did award to 
the Appellant herein the sum of $250.00 per month as and for 
alimony subject to increase or modification and an annual 
review should Mr. Nicholes1 income increase from the present 
$1,665.00 per month gross amount. In the Canning case, the 
husband was found to have had a gross monthly income of 
$2,000.00 per month and Mrs. Canning was awarded no alimony 
such that "David Canning's standard of living will be much 
closer to what it was during the marriage than will be 
Appellant's". In this case Mrs. Nicholes was not only 
awarded $250.00 a month for alimony for an indefinite period 
of time or throughout her life, but was awarded an addition 
$200.00 per month as and for child support further reducing 
Mr. Nicholes1 standard of living and bringing1 it closer to 
the Appellant's. The Trial Court fully realized as stated 
in the trial record and previously referred to that there 
were not sufficient monies to satisfy both parties. Mrs. 
Nicholes claimed monthly expenses of between $1,900.00 to 
$2,100.00 a month (with some discrepancies based on 
cross-examination) with Mr. Nicholes undisputed gross 
monthly income of $1,665.00 had to be considered by the 
court to provide for both families in light of the fact that 
Mr. Nicholes gross monthly income if given totally to the 
Appellant would not even begin to cover her expenses, let 
alone both of them. Therefore, the Trial Court considering 
the needs of the Appellant, her ability to produce income 
for herself and the ability of the husband to provide 
support to the requesting spouse even in light of his 
historical earnings, awarded to the Appellant the sum of 
$450.00 per month. 
Appellant further cites this Court to the Utah Supreme 
Court case of Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988) 
wherein the Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded as 
insufficient the trial court's award of alimony of $1,200.00 
per month to be reduced to $600.00 per month following Mr. 
Gardnerfs retirement. The remand was based on the fact that 
Mrs. Gardner is not employed and had little prospect of 
being re-employed and that Mr. Gardner had substantial 
retirement assets while Mrs. Gardner had no pension and 
would qualify for social security payments only as a 
"ex-wife married over twenty years" and that the likelihood 
of Mrs. Gardner providing for her own retirement was small. 
Mr. Gardner was a physician with earnings of $6,000.00 per 
month. The court further found that explicit findings based 
on the factors in Jones were needed to support the alimony 
award and remanded for further proceedings in light of its 
findings and the factors enumerated in Jones. In the 
immediate case at hand involving the Nicholes, as part of 
the property settlement, Mrs. Nicholes was awarded one-half 
of the equity of the marital residences which was sold almost 
immediately after the divorce with a net amount of 
approximately $20,000.00 divided between the parties. (see 
trial record at page 191) . Additionally the Plaintiff was 
awarded medical insurance under COBRA, substantial personal 
property, no debts, benefits under the United States Social 
Security Act as a wife of the Defendant in excess of twen-
ty-three years, the Defendant provide annually to the 
Plaintiff a copy of his income tax return indicating present 
income and employment, and one-half of any retirement based 
on Woodward. There is no evidence in the Nicholes case as 
compared with the Gardner case that Mr. Nicholes would have 
substantial assets either before or after retirement to 
supplement his income and previous discussion indicates that 
the Trial Court did properly revie^ w the three factors 
discussed in English, Jones and Eames in arriving at its 
decision and award of alimony. 
In Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) this Court found that a decreasing rehabilitative 
alimony award of $800.00 per month to $1.00 over an eight 
year period failed to consider Mr. Rasband!s clear ability 
to provide support and Mrs. Rasbandfs severely limited 
ability to meet her own established financial needs. It 
further found that the Trial Court had failed to make 
detailed findings regarding Mrs. Rasband1s earning capacity. 
The lower court found that $45,000.00 of disposable income 
with Mr. Rasband needing $18,000.00 annually, Mrs. Rasband 
needing $16,800.00 annually for a total of $34,800.00, left 
Mr. Rasband a $10,000.00 annual discretionary income in 
addition to the advantage he enjoyed by being able to 
expense some personal living expenses through the business. 
This is not the situation with the Nicholes. The expenses 
of one party alone, those of Mrs. Nicholes, exceeds by 
$300.00 to $500.00 the gross monthly income of Mr. Nicholes, 
the only party producing income. Additionally, unlike the 
award in Rasband the Trial Court in this case awarded to 
Mrs. Nicholes rehabilitative alimony for an indefinite time 
period or the rest of her life subject to increase depending 
on Mr. Nicholes income, evidence of which will be provided 
annually pursuant to the Decree of Divorce so that there is 
not the disparity found in Rasband. Again, in Nicholes the 
lower court did consider the three factors of English in 
arriving at its award of alimony and there is no abuse of 
discretion such that the award of alimony should be af-
firmed. 
In Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1988) 
this Court in considering Olson v. Olson, Jones v. Jones, 
and English v. English, reversed the decision of the Trial 
Court award of $400.00 per month of terminable alimony after 
five years based on Mr. Martinez's annual income of 
$100,000.00 per year and held that the Plaintiff was enti-
tled to an award on a continuing basis in the sum of $750.00 
per month subject to the provisions of the Utah Code An-
notated §30-3-5. In this case the Plaintiff was awarded 
permanent alimony of $250.00 per month, one-third of the 
ultimate award of Martinez based on an income of Mr. 
Nicholes of approximately one-fifth of the income of Mr. 
Martinez. There is no abuse of discretion in this award and 
unlike Martinez, the Trial Court in this matter is not 
preserving the status of a limited income for one party and 
affluence for the other when one sacrificed to help the 
other achieve such affluence. 
In regards to Mr. Nicholes1 historical earnings, the 
Appellant cites this Court to the Utah Supreme Court case of 
Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985) which held: 
We have held that where the husband has 
experienced a temporary decrease in 
income, his historical earnings must be 
taken into account in determining the 
amount of alimony to be paid. 
It is Respondent's contention that a great deal of 
attention should be paid to the term "temporary" . In the 
Olson case Mr. Olson had formed a consulting business and 
provided consulting services to governmental agencies on a 
contract basis with a fluctuating income depending on his 
current contract. His gross income was $76,000.00 in 1980, 
$62,000.00 in 1981, and $57,000.00 for the first nine months 
in 1982. At the time of trial, the Defendant had no con-
sulting contracts in force and no current income. He was 
negotiating a contract, which he expected to obtain, that 
would bring $3,500.00 a month for the remainder of 1982. 
The Trial Court in Olson considered the historical earnings 
of Mr. Olson because at the time of the trial he did have a 
"temporary" decrease in his income but based on the fact 
that Mr. Olson was then negotiating a contract which he 
expected to obtain and would bring $3,500.00 a month for the 
remainder of 1982, the Trial Court after considering those 
factors issued a Memorandum Decision providing the Defendant 
pay to the Plaintiff $1,600.00 per month as alimony. The 
Supreme Court found that the Trial Court had considered Mr. 
Olson's historical earnings and properly did so under the 
facts of the case and found no abuse of discretion in the 
alimony award given with Mr. Olson's potential from the job 
he had been working in the past and was presently working 
despite a temporary decrease in earnings of between 
$57,000.00 to $76,000.00 a year. 
The Appellant further cites this Court to Westenskow v. 
Westenshow, 562 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1977) with the position that 
"When the obligor has experienced a temporary decrease in 
income it is reasonable for the Court to impute the 
obligor's income based on his historical earning ability". 
Again, great deference should be paid to the term "tempo-
rary" decrease in income. In Westenshow the Plain-
tiff/husband was ordered to pay to the Defendant/wife, 
alimony in the sum of $75.00 for a period of six months, 
with an increase to $100.00 per month for a period of six 
months. Then a final sum of $150.00 per month for a period 
of four years. The alimony would then terminate. In 
Westenskow the Plaintiff/husband was a college graduate that 
had been employed by a large corporation as a marketing 
representative, earning an annual salary of $18,000.00. In 
August, 1975, he terminated his employment and organized his 
own company. The trial was held November 3, 1987, and 
Plaintiff's record of his compensation for his company was 
for the month of October only; the sum was $600.00. Plain-
tiff testified he expected his income to improve. 
The Court found at page 57: 
...here Plaintiff has an established 
ability to earn $18,000.00 annually. He 
presented a record of one month indicat-
ing a diminished income. It would be 
reasonable for the court to infer that 
either Plaintiff's income ftom his 
business would increase or he would seek 
other employment with an adequate 
renumeration reflecting his historical 
earning abiility. Under such circum-
stances the automatic increments in 
alimony and child support were not 
inequitable... Like Olson, the Plain-
tiff/husband has encountered a 
"temporary" decrease in his income fully 
expecting based on his own testimony, 
although not established by a potential 
contract of $3,500.00 a month as in 
Olson, but by Mr. Westenskowfs own 
testimony that his income would improve 
and Mr. Westenskow had the potential and 
capacity to again earn $18,000.00 a 
year. 
In Westenskow the diminished earnings were represented 
only a one month time period, whereas in this case the 1986 
tax return showed a one year diminished income of approxi-
mately $22,000.00 due to the fact that the Defendant/husband 
was working a full-time job. Again in the Nicholes case, 
unlike the Westenskow case, the Trial Court did specifically 
provide through the Decree that on an annual basis the 
Defendant would provide to the Plaintiff a statement of his 
income with the understanding that an increase in his 
monthly income would entitle the Plaintiff to move for 
additional alimony under the continuing jurisdiction of the 
Trial Court. 
Numerous references have been made to rulings and 
statements made by the Trial Court in regards to Mr. 
Nicholes current income and why the Court considered current 
income rather than the historical earnings. Appellant has 
indicated that the trial Judge refused to hear evidence 
concerning Mr. Nicholes1 historical earnings and his ability 
to earn it in the future, when quite to the contrary the 
trial record at page 167 has an interjection to the Respon-
dent's counsel questioning Mr. Nicholes as to his work 
history. The trial Judge indicated as follows: 
The Court: I don't see the need for 
it, really. 
Mr. Walpole: Okay. 
The Court: I think I've heard enough 
about income, work. 
The previous comments by the court as presented in 
argument in Point I. of this brief show more than sufficient 
evidence of the trial Judge's knowledge of the Respondent's 
income and work history and historical earnings such that 
the trial Judge specifically ruled on the present income of 
the Respondent as being $1,665.00 and due to the present 
work conditions and circumstances found that to be the 
Respondent's current income. 
The Appellant fails to make any reference to the 
deposition of Dennis H. Gordon, M.D., as reviewed by the 
trial Judge and as properly published in regards to the 
Defendant's employability (see trial record at pages 167, 
190 and trial record page 197). At the deposition of Dennis 
H. Gordon, M.D. taken October 2, 1987, Dr. Gordon stated 
that he first began seeing the Defendant for medical reasons 
on May 10, 1985, and that prior to that he had been treated 
by other physicians for recurrent dislocations of his 
shoulder and had had quite a long history of increasing 
deformity of the knee. (See deposition page 5). Dr. Gordon 
in the following pages further described the dislocation of 
the Defendant's right shoulder and unrelated right knee 
problems, with subsequent visits by Mr. Nicholes to Dr. 
Gordon on May 10th, May 31st, June 14th, July 19th, August 
12th, September 13th and November of 1985, and then again in 
January of 1986, May of 1987 and September of 1987 (see 
deposition at page 10). Beginning on page 13 of the deposi-
tion, Dr. Gordon states that: 
Any high impact on that knee simply 
increases the deterioration of it and 
he's got a fair amount of wear. He's 
got calcification in both menisci. He's 
got extensive changes in the knee, so' if 
he stays away from high impacts to it, 
it will last longer. 
In response to a question on what high impact would 
consist of, Dr Gordon responded "running, jumping, certainly 
any sports are going to cause impact to be eliminated. 
Anytime you are carrying heavy weights you're going to 
increase the stresses onto it, climbing, bending, squats, 
deep-knee bends, duck-walks, anything like that are very 
detrimental to a knee like that. So you need to stay away 
from that. In answer to a question about any specific 
recommendations concerning Mr. Nicholes working one or two 
jobs, Dr. Gordon responded "it depends on what the jobs are. 
It is an impact type problem primarily that we are dealing 
with and two jobs of a heavy construction type position are 
quite unreasonable on the joint. He's going to have paid, 
and he's going to have more rapid breakdown if he keeps 
stressing it that way." Dr. Gordon further stated that his 
recommendation would be to stay away from labor, taking a 
desk job, but that he did not think that Mr. Nicholes had 
the training, but that his recommendation would be a 
non-manual or non-stressful type job. (See deposition pages 
15, 16 and 17). 
On his cross-examination concerning the working of two 
jobs, Dr. Gordon testified: 
.. .my recollection is that from our 
previous evaluations on him, that he had 
been working two jobs, and I had been — 
this issue came up, and I informed him 
that I did not feel that was really 
reasonable to be working two labor type 
situations. 
When you are talking about two 
jobs, I guess it is -- are we talking 
about two part-time jobs? Two 
eight-hour jobs? I don't think that 
that's the significant thing. I think 
that the significant thing is the amount 
of impact that he's putting on the 
extremity, and that's really what I was 
stressing.... I know that we have 
discussed the fact and my recollection 
was that he had done a fair amount of 
carrying, and I think that the part-time 
job required carrying, and for some 
reason I'm thinking of carrying hod or 
carrying construction-type equipment or 
something; fair amount of climbing and 
carrying of heavy objects. 
I don't remember what the job at 
Kennecott involved. (See deposition 
pages 19 and 20). 
On further cross-examination in regards to Mr. 
Nicholes1 knee, Dr. Gordon stated: 
Squatting, deep-knee bends, 
duck-walks are all going to be detri-
mental. Climbing is going to be detri-
mental, and this brings in stairs. That 
doesn't mean that you can't do them, but 
you ought not to do extensive amounts of 
them. If you want this knee to last as 
long as you can then you protect it, and 
you unweight it as much as you can.... 
I would try and preserve that knee 
as long as you could until you reach a 
point where pain limits you sufficiently 
enough to undergo the surgical inter-
vention, which would be a replacement 
type arthoplasty (see deposition pages 
23 and 24). 
Lastly, on pages 27 through 28 in response to Plain-
tiff's counsel's cross-examination on retraining, Dr. Gordon 
stated: 
I think it would be very wise if he 
could be retrained, yes. And then we 
run into a real problem with this on so 
many people. 
Drywallers that come into us at age 
35 with back problems, or 40 years old, 
and they have made high salaries or 
substantial salaries, and all of a 
sudden they find themselves going back 
to a job that's going to be much less 
paying, and they don't want to do it, 
and I can understand, but the further 
they go the more difficult it becomes 
for them. 
I don't think there is any question 
that somebody with this knee and right 
shoulder would be better off in a 
non-labor type situation. 
Based on the foregoing case law and facts from the 
Nicholes case as applied to that case law, the Trial Court 
did properly consider the three factors spelled out in 
English, and also took into consideration the Defendant's 
historical earnings and applying the facts particular to the 
Nicholes case and within the Trial Court's discretion did 
properly award to the Plaintiff alimony of $250.00 per month 
for an indefinite time period with an annual review of the 
Defendant's income for future potential modification if 
appropriate such that the Trial Court's Order should be 
affirmed. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ITS DETERMINATION OF THE 
CHILD SUPPORT AWARD. 
Under Utah statutory law as spelled out in the Utah 
Code Annotated §78-45-7 you are entitled to a determination 
of amount of support states: 
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(2)...in determining the amount of 
perspective support, the court shall 
consider all relevant factors, including 
but not limited to: (a) the standard of 
living and the situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of 
the parties; (c) the ability of the 
obligor to earn; (d) the ability of the 
obligee to earn; (e) the need of the 
obligee; (f) the age of the parties; (g) 
the responsibility of the obligor for 
the support of others. 
The Appellant makes reference to Astorga v. Julio, 564 
P.2d 1385 (Utah 1977) to indicate that the underlying 
objective of child support is to reach an equitable propor-
tion to each parent of a "reasonable and proper share of the 
child's expenses." Our review of that case shows that it is 
a proceeding under the Bastardy Act, which is civil in 
nature and whose purpose is to compel the father of a child 
to support it during its tender years. This proceeding is 
not a proceeding under the Bastardy Act, but is a divorce 
action in equity and therefore the case of Astorga v. Julio 
has no application. 
In Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983) the 
Supreme Court held that "where a marriage is of long dura-
tion and the earning capacity of one spouse greatly outcedes 
that of the other... it is appropriate to order alimony and 
child support at a level which will insure that the support-
ed spouse and children may maintain a standard of living not 
unduly disproportionate to that which they would have 
enjoyed had the marriage continued. In Savage the Trial 
Court found the Defendant had a gross income annually in 
excess of $133,000.00 and a net monthly income of $7,362.00. 
The Defendants evidence at trial showed his monthly ex-
penses to be $3,140.00 with the Court ultimately awarding to 
the Plaintiff $2,000.00 in alimony and $1,500.00 per month 
in child support or $500.00 per month per child with the 
combined figures still leaving the Defendant with approxi-
mately $800.00 in excess. The Plaintiff's evidence showed 
her monthly expenses were $4,100.00. In the immediate case 
at hand, the Plaintiff1s testimony was a need of between 
$1,900.00 to $2,200.00 per month (see trial record at page 
71), while the Defendant's exhibit showed expenses of 
$1,554.00 per month (see trial record at page 76), calculat-
ing expenses of both parties an income would be needed of 
$3,700.00 or more per month to meet the needs testified to 
by both parties with an income of only $1,665.00 per month. 
The Nicholes case can be distinguished from the Savage case 
in that in Savage there was plenty of income to meet the 
needs and expenses of the parties whereas in this case, 
neither of the parties if the monies are to be disbursed 
between them will be able to meet their financial obliga-
tions or to maintain the standard of living and situation of 
the parties. The money is simply not civailable to pay both 
parties1 expenses and although it might be appropriate to 
order alimony and child support at a level which will ensure 
that the supported spouse and children maintain a standard 
of living not unduly proportionate to that which they have 
enjoyed had the marriage continued, the monies were not and 
are not available for disbursement to meet the needs of both 
parties. 
The Trial Court in determining the amount of child 
support must consider all relevant factors including those 
statutorily enumerated above or it will constitute an abuse 
of discretion. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 (Utah 
App, 1988). The Appellant cites Stevens v. Stevens, 754 
P. 2d 952 (Utah App. 1988) wherein the Trial Court in con-
sidering child support made only two limited conclusionary 
findings regarding child support; (1) that a reasonable sum 
for the Plaintiff to pay to the Defendant for the support 
and maintenance of each child the sum of $175.00 per child 
per month, (2) that although the income tax returns supplied 
by the Plaintiff on their face might not justify the award 
of support and alimony hereinabove provided, the Court has 
determined from the evidence submitted at the trial, that a 
substantial amount of tax-free income is generated by the 
Plaintiff's activities, and he can afford to pay the sums 
for support and alimony as hereinabove provided. In this 
case the trial Judge made findings "that Mrs. Nicholes is 
unemployed and has physical problems that prevent her 
employment." (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
at page 2) The record further indicates that Mrs. Nicholes 
is 40 years old (see trial record at pages 28 through 29) . 
Mr. Nicholes age of 41 can be determined from the deposition 
of Dr. Gordon (see deposition at page ) . The Findings 
of Fact further indicate that Mr. Nicholes due to his 
present work circumstances and physical abilities is earning 
$1,665.00 per month as the sole provider for the family and 
the testimony given shows that Mr. Nicholes is the father of 
the child or obligor and therefore has the responsibility 
for the support of the obligee. No testimony was offered as 
to the minor child, Rebecca, or the obligee working. The 
Plaintiff presented a Financial Declaration testimony on 
exhibits as to her expenses as acknowledged on the record of 
between $1,900.00 to $2,200.00 per month such that each of 
the seven statutory factors required to be reviewed by the 
Trial Court were reviewed and considered and an award made 
of $100.00 per month per child and there was no abuse of 
discretion. 
Although the Verified Complaint of the Plaintiff for 
divorce did plead for $300.00 per month per child in child 
support to be increased to $450.00 per month for the support 
of the minor child, Rebecca, after the child support for 
Jason was terminated. At the time of trial, the Plaintiff 
responding to her counsel indicated that she felt necessary 
child support in order for her to care for their needs would 
be "probably around $300,00 a child a month." (See trial 
record at page 66). Subsequent thereto, Plaintiff's Exhibit 
5 detailing the income and expenses was submitted and in 
response to the question from Plaintiff's counsel "and would 
it be your testimony that that would be your monthly ex-
penses and necessary to take care of yourself and your two 
children?", the Plaintiff answered "yes, it could be higher. 
That was last February" (see trial record at pages 66 to 
67). No further requests were made by the Plaintiff of the 
Court and in particular the Plaintiff did not ask of the 
Court that child support be increased to a different amount 
once the minor child, Jason, became emancipated so that this 
issue is brought for the first time on appeal and should not 
be considered and the Trial Court is not under an obligation 
to sua sponte or on its own motion or grant a perspective 
child support award under the auspices that there will be a 
potential change in circumstances, otherwise every Trial 
Court considering any award of child support would be 
required to propose changes in child support on a perspec-
tive basis unknowing that eventually that passage of time 
each of the minor children will become emancipated. 
Accordingly, based on the arguments rendered in Point I 
concerning the Court's review of the obligor's or Mr. 
Nicholes ability to earn, his income, his standard of living 
and the ages of the parties with the additional finding that 
the Defendant, Mr, Nicholes, is the father of the minor 
child and the needs of the obligee having been presented by 
the Plaintiff along with her expenses, and the Plaintiff 
having failed to provide any further or individual needs of 
the obligee or any proof or evidence as to the ability of 
the obligee to earn, essentially all factors were before the 
Court and considered by the Court in rendering its decision 
to award to the Plaintiff from the Defendant the sum of 
$100.00 per month per child as and for child support to 
terminate upon reaching the age of 18 or graduation from 
high school in due course, whichever came later, and the 
Trial Court did not abuse its discretion and the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
"The totality of the factual evidence in the record is 
clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting a finding 
in favor of the judgment of the need for child support" and 
should not be disturbed. Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 
(Utah 1987). The record is also replete with the financial 
needs of the children and the relative ability of Plaintiff 
and Defendant to meet those needs. See Martinez v._ 
Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1988) 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN AWARDING MR. NICHOLES THE 
RIGHT TO CLAIM THE MINOR CHILDREN AS 
DEPENDENTS FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES. 
Martinez v. Martinez, supra, considers the provision of 
a separation agreement as being no longer effective and 
thereby allowing the Plaintiff who had previously through a 
separation agreement granted Defendant tax exemptions to 
request through her Amended Complaint the tax exemptions for 
all three children putting the distribution of tax 
exemptions at issue in the divorce proceeding. 
In this case the Verified Complaint does not request 
that Plaintiff be awarded the tax exemptions of the minor 
children whereas the Defendant specifically requested in his 
Counterclaim that he be entitled to claim the minor children 
as dependents for income tax purposes (see trial record at 
page 23) . 
It is the Appellant's position that the only way that 
Mr. Nicholes can be given the children as tax exemptions is 
if Mrs. Nicholes signs the written declaration giving him 
the exemptions, and that the Internal Revenue Code 
contemplates a voluntarily written declaration by the 
custodial parent to allow those exemptions, and that it is 
beyond the jurisdiction of the Trial Court to order the 
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custodial parent to involuntarily execute the written 
declaration. In Martinez this Court specifically states as 
follows: 
By amending her complaint, Plaintiff 
modified an affirmatively rejected the 
pre-divorce distribution. Plaintiff is 
entitled to the tax exemptions for all 
of the children in view of the award of 
custody to her and the failure of 
Defendant to establish any exception to 
the general rule stated above. 
The Plaintiff has not requested that she be awarded the 
tax exemptions, neither in her Verified Complaint or upon 
review of the trial record, at the time of the trial. 
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Cross v. 
Cross, directly considered this issue and found that a 
court, as part of a child support award, may allocate the 
income tax child dependency exemption to the non-custodial 
parent by requiring the custodial parent to sign the waiver 
required by the 1984 Tax Reform Act. The Court1 further held 
that the 1984 amendment to §152 (e) of the Internal Revenue 
Code was designed to simplify the handling of dependency 
exemptions by relieving the IRS of the administrative burden 
shouldered under prior law of resolving factual disputes 
between divorced parents over the issue of who actually 
provides more support for a child. Under the 1984 Act, the 
Court explains, the custodial parent always gets the 
exemption unless he or she assigns it to the other parent by 
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executing a written waiver. Because a Court Order standing 
alone, - without the necessary IRS waiver form - would be 
ineffected to transfer the exemption, and because nothing in 
the Act precludes the Court from requiring execution of the 
waiver, the Court concludes the Trial Courts have the power 
to order a custodial parent to sign the necessary waiver. 
This Court decision is in accord with recent rulings from 
Minnesota and Arizona and is "diametrically opposed" to a 
1986 Texas case (Davis v. Fair, 707 S.W.2d 711 (Texas Ct. 
App. 1986) . It appears that only four other states have 
considered this issue since the 1984 amendments became 
effective and in no state has the issue reached the state's 
highest court, [See Scip v, Scip, 725 S.W.2d 134 (Mo, Ct. 
App. 1987) and Gleason v. Michlitsch, 728 P.2d 965 (Oregon 
Ct. App, 1986)] [See also Fudenberg v. Molstad, 390 N.W.2d 
19 (Minnesota Ct. App. 1986) and Lincoln v.- Lincoln, 13 
F.L.R. 1535 (Arizona Ct. App. 1987)] Both of which assert 
that a custodial parent may be required to execute the 
necessary waiver of exemption in favor of the non-custodial 
parent who is paying child support in appropriate cases. 
The Court further held that under 1984 Act a State Court did 
not have the power to allocate the exemption simply by Court 
Order alone, but it does have the equitable power to 
require the custodial parent to sign the waiver. In that 
regard the Texas case missed the fact that there is no 
prohibition expressed or implied on a State Courtfs 
requiring the execution of the waiver, and because the State 
Court allocation of dependency exemptions has been customary 
for decades, it is more reasonable than not to infer that if 
Congress intended to forbid State Courts from allocating the 
exemption by requiring the waiver to be signed, Congress 
would have said so. 
In this connection, it is interesting to note that 
Texas was the only state that discouraged Court ordered 
allocation under the old law. 
The Court further goes on to state that the IRS statute 
is entirely silent concerning whether a Domestic Court can 
require a custodial parent to execute a waiver, and this 
silence demonstrates Congress1 surpassing indifference to 
have the exemption as allocated as long as the Internal 
Revenue Services doesn't have to do the allocating. 
Additionally, it should be noted that in the final 
Decree of Divorce awarding the right to the Defendant to 
claim the minor children as dependents for purposes of the 
calculation of his State and Federal income tax dependent 
decuctions, the Defendant is only entitled to do that if he 
is current in his child support obligations at the end of 
each year and that the Plaintiff has been ordered to execute 
the necessary waivers. There is the additional proviso that 
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should the Plaintiff earn in excess of $7,500.00 per year 
that she would be awarded the right to claim the minor 
child, Rebecca Ann, as a dependent for purposes of the 
calculation of her Federal and State tax dependent 
deductions. For the Court to award otherwise when the 
medical testimony and the testimony of the Plaintiff 
irrefutably established the fact that Plaintiff is 
unemployable would be an abuse of discretion in equity. 
According, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion 
in awarding to the Defendant the minor child for income tax 
deduction purposes and the order should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above and foregoing facts, case law and 
statutes, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding to the Plaintiff alimony of $250.00 per month as it 
properly reviewed the three factors. The Trial Court also 
did not abuse its discretion in awarding to the Plaintiff 
child support of $100.00 per month per child as it properly 
reviewed the seven factors. Finally, the Trial Court did 
not abuse its discretion in awarding to the Defendant the 
minor children of the parties for income tax purposes. 
Therefore, the decision of the Trial Court should be 
affirmed and attorney's fees or costs awarded to the 
Defendant. 
DATED this 3 0 day of September, 1988. 
4 AM\ 
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